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PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Good morning. Erwin and I have
grouped the cases of last term into five categories. Let me just
spell those out. First is the enforcement of constitutional rights
under § 1983; second is qualified immunity; third is enforcement
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of federal statutes under § 1983; fourth is pleading issues, and the
fifth topic is Bivens3 claims.
Erwin and I are going to attempt not to just describe the
holdings from last term, but to put those holdings in a broader
context and try to figure out the litigation significance of the
decisions. We may have some disagreement from time to time; it
is strictly professional. We are good friends, so I do not want you
to get upset if you hear disagreement.
Let me start with the first subject, the enforcement of
federal constitutional rights under § 1983.' At this point in the
development of § 1983 law, we see in the decisional law a very
wide range of constitutional rights that are asserted by plaintiffs
under § 1983. I would say the most common are Fourth
Amendment challenges to arrests, searches, and uses of force; and
3 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). An action for damages to vindicate constitutional rights that
have been violated by an individual federal government official has been dubbed
a Bivens claim. Id. at 396-97.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
2
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certainly large numbers of First Amendment claims, especially
retaliation claims; procedural due process claims; and equal
protection claims. In addition to these are some of the lesser
utilized constitutional rights from time to time, such as a Bill of
Attainder claim asserted under § 1983, Ex Post Facto Clause
claims, and Dormant Commerce Clause claims.
That leads me to the Supreme Court's decision of last term
dealing with takings claims. Takings claims may be asserted under
§ 1983 if the plaintiff can satisfy the fairly stringent ripeness
requirements articulated by the Supreme Court.5 The plaintiff has
to show a final decision as to the use of the property obtained from
the local authorities, and an attempt to obtain just compensation
from the state courts.6 These ripeness requirements may be hard to
satisfy. Further, when the plaintiff tries to satisfy the ripeness
requirements and goes to state court, the plaintiff often runs into
preclusion problems in returning to the federal court. I am just
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress....
Id.
5 See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997);
Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1998); Williamson
County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
6 See, e.g., Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186 n.13.
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wondering why plaintiffs continue to file these takings claims in
federal court under § 1983. 1 am interested to hear Erwin's take on
this. Takings claims were traditionally the type of claim asserted
in state courts; land use is traditionally a matter of state concern.
And yet, I think over the past twenty-five years there has been a
tremendous increase in the volume of takings claims filed in the
federal courts. I am wondering, is it the fee awards in federal court
do you think, or something else?
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I think it is many things. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that § 1983 can be used for
takings claims. In the City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes7 case
two years ago, the Supreme Court said there can be these claims.8
If it is brought as a § 1983 claim and the plaintiff is successful,
fees are recoverable under § 1988, 9 which is different than if it was
just a takings claim in the state court. Also, often civil rights
7 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
' Id. at 725-26.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [§ 1983)
*.. the court, in its discretion may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs. ...
4
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plaintiffs in particular states perceive the federal courts as more
hospitable to civil rights claims or just takings claims than state
courts. So, I think for a variety of reasons, most important that the
Supreme Court said they can be brought in federal court, these
cases are increasingly brought in federal court.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: I still think it is somewhat unusual
that you have this large volume of takings claims, yet probably
statistically a fairly small percentage of them succeed. That is my
observation. Many get knocked out procedurally on ripeness
grounds. And in terms of trying to establish a taking of property,
that is not all that easy.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: The other thing is that the
Supreme Court has, in some cases, opened the door wider to
takings claims. For example, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,0 the
Court said a property owner can bring a takings claim even as to
Id.
1o533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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regulations that were in place at the time the property was
acquired."
So, imagine a person who knows that there are
environmental or zoning restrictions on a property; a person could
buy the property with the goal of then bringing a takings challenge.
I think that the Supreme Court, though inconsistent, has been, in
some cases, more receptive to challenges than the lower federal
courts.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: And maybe there have been some
indications of loosening up the ripeness requirements, which
brings us to last term's case, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council. 2
I think to put the case in context, there are two types of
government actions that will lead a court to automatically find a
categorical or per se taking of property. One is the physical
occupation of property by the government.' 3 The example that I
" Id. at 627 ("Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable
limitations on the use and value of land.").
12 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002).
13 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982).
6
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use in class sometimes is, what if the state decided to put its capital
in your backyard; the state would be physically invading your
property and would have to give the landowner just compensation.
The other type of per se taking would be a government regulation
depriving the landowner of all economic value of the property.'4 I
think that does not happen too often. And then for other types of
challenges where the government regulation is claimed to
constitute a taking, there is this balancing that occurs."5 The court
looks at the extent of the interference with "reasonable investment
backed expectations," which is a phrase used over and over again
but never defined. That gets balanced against the government
interest.
The issue in Tahoe-Sierra was whether a thirty-two month
moratorium on development of the property constituted a per se
taking of property. 6 The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision,
held that it did not.'7 The reasoning was there was no physical
occupation or invasion by the government, and there was no denial
' 4 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
'5 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978).
16 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306.
17 Id. at 342.
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of all economically viable use of the property because when the
moratorium is lifted, the value of the property would then revert to
the owner. 8 The landowner was not deprived of all economically
viable use of the property. I think that when this case was decided,
landowners were very upset. They had won a recent victory in the
Supreme Court'9 and they thought this trend would continue.
There is always the celebration group and the sad group. In this
case, the celebrators were the environmentalists and the land use
planners. Do you think this is an overreaction by property owners?
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I do think the case is an
enormous victory for local governments as well as
environmentalists. I want to start by saying that I characterize the
holding a bit differently than you do. The issue here is whether the
thirty-two month delay in development is a taking. You rightly
point out that Justice Stevens says it is not a possessory or per se
taking.2" He also says it is not a per se regulatory taking.2' He says
18 Id. at 341 ("In fact, there is reason to believe property values often will
continue to increase despite a moratorium.").
'9 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606.
2 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 324-25.
"1 Id. at 325.
8
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that the Court is not saying that moratoria are never regulatory
takings, nor is the Court saying that moratoria are always
regulatory takings. -2  Rather, he says that deciding whether a
particular moratorium is a regulatory taking requires that kind of
balancing that you alluded to.
23
Justice Stevens gives guidance to lawyers and judges. He
says to consider the length of the moratorium relative to the life
span of the property and the cost to the owner of the property
relative to the investment backed expectations. 24 He emphasizes
the benefit to the local government in terms of moratoria.2 '5 His
words strongly say that there is a need for local governments to
have delays in the development of property for environmental and
permit reviews.26 The attorney for the developer said that even a
one day delay in development should be regarded as a taking, and
22 Id. at 321.
23Id. at 335 ("[W]e are persuaded that the better approach to claims that a
regulation has effected a temporary taking 'requires careful examination and
weighing of all the relevant circumstances.' ") (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
636 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
24 Id. at 338.
25 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337-38 ("[M]oratoria ... are used widely among
land use planners to preserve the status quo while formulating a more permanent
development strategy.").
26 ld. at 329.
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the government should have to compensate to spread the loss.27
Had the Supreme Court adopted that position, it would
tremendously limit the ability of local governments to engage in
land use planning and the environmental protection process. But, I
think that the Court's rejection of that position gives guidance to
those of you who represent local governments. The label that is
used seems to matter enormously. Here, the local government
called what it was doing a moratorium. 2' The Supreme Court
spoke of the need for moratoria. Consider this case with one from
a decade ago, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.2' David
Lucas bought a piece of beachfront property in South Carolina for
almost a million dollars."0 Subsequent to purchase, the state
adopted a coastal protection law that prevented any development
of Lucas' property.3 He sued, and ultimately won, with the Court
saying it was a regulatory taking because any development of the
27 Id. at 320.
" Id. at 311-12 (describing the two moratoria at issue as the combination of
ordinance and resolution which effectively prohibited all development on
sensitive lands in California and on other lands in the Basin for thirty-two
months, and on sensitive lands in Nevada for eight months).
29 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
30 Id. at 1006.
"' Id. at 1007.
10
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property was prevented.32 It turns out that the prohibition on
development of Lucas' property was repealed two years later.33
Lucas was kept from developing his property for two years, but he
won; it was a taking. In the Tahoe case, it was thirty-two months,
a longer period of time where no development was allowed; yet
there the landowner lost. 4 What explains that seeming anomaly? :
the label. If it is called a moratorium, then it is seen as temporary
and the Court is going to balance the competing interests to
determine its reasonableness. If it is labeled by the local
government so that it seems permanent, then the court is willing to
find it a regulatory taking. If I were advising local governments, I
would encourage them to use the word "moratorium" when
possible and articulate reasons why it is a moratorium (i.e.: for
purposes of study and review). That label
alone would make a lot of difference.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The other thing I would point out
in Tahoe-Sierra is language from Justice Stevens that a
32 Id. at 1031-32.
31 Id. at 1010-11.
34 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342.
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moratorium of over one year should be viewed with a special
skepticism. 35 I would say that this language is ammunition for
landowners to use in special cases. Staying with the topic of
enforcement of the constitutional rights under § 1983, I think one
of the toughest challenges is governmental action that looks like it
is wrong and trying to translate that conduct into a constitutional
violation. I find that no matter how many years I study
constitutional law and read Erwin's treatises, I still cannot always
come up with a confident answer to that question. I think part of
the answer is that not all government wrongdoing translates into a
constitutional violation. The other answer, I suppose, is that when
nothing is left, plaintiffs attorneys turn to the substantive due
process "shocks the conscience" standard. But, anybody who does
this work for even a relatively short period of time finds out that
federal judges' consciences do not get shocked too easily.
I was trying to think of reasons for that. Maybe they see
too much bad stuff so that in time their consciences get numbed
instead of shocked; I do not know. Maybe this is due to the fact
that judges think of substantive due process as the claim of last
Id. at 341.
12
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resort, or maybe the due process standards are just too tough. It
got me thinking that maybe plaintiffs lawyers should try to be
somewhat more creative and see if there is some other theory to
rely upon. That got me, in turn, thinking about the Supreme
Court's decision of last term in Christopher v. Harbury,36 dealing
with the constitutionally protected right of judicial access.
In this case, the plaintiff, attorney Jennifer K. Harbury,
argued her own case in the Supreme Court. She claimed that
federal governmental officials deceived her and concealed
information about the whereabouts and circumstances of her
husband in Guatemala. She alleged her husband was being
detained and tortured at the hands of Army officials in Guatemala
who were being paid by the CIA. This deception, she claims,
denied her access to the courts.37
There has been somewhat of a proliferation of these
judicial access claims. The plaintiff comes into federal court
claiming that the government has either suppressed the information
or deceived her in some way, and as a result, claims that she has
36 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
"7 Id. at 405.
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been unable to assert a particular cause of action. Or alternatively,
the plaintiff claims that she has been able to assert the cause of
action but has not been able to litigate the claim fully because of
this misrepresentation by the government.
I think that last term's decision in the Harbury case is
somewhat of a mixture in my mind of good news and bad news for
plaintiffs' lawyers. It is definitely bad news for Jennifer Harbury
because her claim was rejected unanimously.38 I think that in terms
of the constitutional right of judicial access, there is somewhat
good and bad news; this is a mixed opinion. For one thing, I see
this decision as being the first time that the United States Supreme
Court has recognized this particular type of constitutional denial of
judicial access claim. The types of judicial access claims that the
Supreme Court has dealt with in the past concerned more systemic
issues, normally a fee requirement in, for example, a divorce
proceeding.39 Harbury is different. This is a particular instance of
deceit or concealment. As I read the opinion, the Supreme Court
does recognize that the plaintiff could allege that this type of
38 
.d.39 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (197 1).
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/5
.2003] SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 639
wrongdoing by the government constitutes a violation of the
constitutionally protected right of judicial access.
There is a footnote in the opinion that says prior decisions
have found a right of judicial access grounded on the privileges
and immunities clause of Article IV,4  the petition clause4' and the
due process clause.42 So, I think that there is potential here to use
this decision in future cases. I think the negative here is that the
Supreme Court's decision requires the federal court plaintiff
asserting this type of denial of judicial access claim to allege in the
complaint the underlying cause of action that was interfered with
as if that cause of action was before the court.3
For example, if you have a federal court plaintiff that says
the government's concealment prevented her from asserting a
common law negligence claim, that plaintiff would have to assert
the negligence claim as if that negligence claim was before the
court. I smell a type of Catch-22 there. The plaintiff's claim is that
40 Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415 n.12 (citing Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898);
The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79 (1873)).
41 Id. (citing Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983);
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)).
42 Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974); Boddie, 401 U.S.
at 380-81).431Id. at 416.
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the concealment or the deception prevented her from having all of
the information needed to litigate the claim. I think that the court's
pleading requirement is unrealistic. The other thing the Court says
must be alleged in the complaint is the remedy that the plaintiff is
seeking for denial of the right of judicial access.44 I think that this
should not be such a big deal. The plaintiff can just say, "I want
money damages for the denial of my constitutionally protected
right."
I want to hear Erwin's take on this because when we spoke
about this the other day, he did not think this decision was as
important as I did. I do think it is important because it provides
ammunition for plaintiffs to take the type of government
wrongdoing and assert a denial of judicial access claim instead of
relying on substantive due process.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I think the definition of
optimism tends to be that civil rights lawyers can find something
good in a nine-to-nothing loss in the claim of a civil rights
plaintiff. Let me offer three quick thoughts on this. First, it is
44 id.
16
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important to remember that § 1983 creates a cause of action for
violations of the Constitution or federal laws by those acting under
color of law, but it does not create a substantive right itself. The
right has to be found in the Constitution or in the federal statutes.
Justice Rehnquist said twenty years ago that § 1983 is not a "font
of tort law," but rather a means for affording a civil remedy for
deprivations of federally protected rights. 5 I think the reason due
process becomes so important is that absent a specific
constitutional provision, the plaintiff needs to turn to the words
"liberty" or "property" in the due process clause as the basis for the
claim.
Second, it is important to remember that Harbury comes up
as a Bivens suit, the Federal counterpart to a § 1983 suit. This is a
situation where it was not a suit against a state or local officer, but
against the federal Secretary of State; therefore, it has to be
presented as a Bivens suit.46 Not only does it matter in presenting
the underlying constitutional right, but it certainly fits into a theme
41 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
46 Harbury, 536 U.S. at 408.
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we have been talking about of how Bivens plaintiffs lose in the
Supreme Court so consistently.
Finally, I find relatively little encouragement from a
plaintiffs perspective about the decision regarding right of access
to courts. I would tie this to a Supreme Court case about six years
ago, Lewis v. Case, 47 involving the rights of prisoners to have
access to the courts. There was an earlier Supreme Court case,
Bounds v. Smith,48 that also spoke of a fundamental right of access
to the courts and the rights of prisoners to have access to prison
libraries. 9 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Lewis, states that
there is no such fundamental right of access to the court or to
prison libraries. He says that in order for a prisoner to bring a
claim of denial of access to the court, the prisoner would have to
show that he or she would win the case if only he or she had access
to the prison library."
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: That is a Catch-22; I cannot show I
can win the case because the prison will not let me use the law
41 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
48430 U.S. 817 (1977).
49 id. at 828.
'0 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
18
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books or the prison library.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: Justice Scalia phrases that as a
standing requirement." I think that this case, Harbury, is also a
rejection of a right of access to the courts. I would phrase the key
part of Justice Souter's majority opinion a bit differently than you
do. I see what the majority is saying as there is only a claim of
denial of access to the courts if it can provide some remedy that
could not be gained in another lawsuit. Here, the Supreme Court
says that Jennifer Harbury can bring a claim against former
Secretary of State Warren Christopher for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 2 Anything that she could get in a suit for
denial of access to the courts she could also get in a separate
lawsuit for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore,
there is not a separate claim for denial of access to the courts.
There must be something that a cause of action for denial of access
to the courts would provide that could not be gained in any other
lawsuit for any other cause of action. That seems a very difficult
5' Id. at 349.
52 Harbury, 536 U.S. at 421.
19
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burden to meet. It does not seem to leave many claims for denial
of access to the courts.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: It seems like a long route to say
maybe this type of claim does not exist, but the Court leaves open
the potential for asserting it. The Court says you just have to
allege A and you allege B, and you can make out a violation of this
right.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: It is possible to prevail so long
as it can be shown that something can be gained through the claim
of denial of access to the courts that could not be gained through
the cause of action that you are now able to bring.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: How about the information that
has been suppressed? I think there is a 9/11 issue here because we
are talking about government actions, suppressing information,
deceit, and access to the courts. There is an undertone to this
decision that indicates there could be some important context here.
20
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PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: It'also says that in an area like
this, where we are dealing with foreign policy, we have to be very
deferential to the government. This is about a woman whose
husband was killed in Guatemala. She said she repeatedly made
requests for information about his whereabouts and she was lied to.
She argued that if she was given the accurate information she
could have taken steps in court to protect him, but she was not able
to do that because she was deceived. The Court does not seem
sympathetic to that claim.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Let me point out that this right of
judicial access could be the basis of a retaliation claim. There are a
fair number of cases brought sometimes by prisoners, sometimes
by landowners, and sometimes by public employees. 3 They allege
that the government took negative action against them because
they had the gall to bring a lawsuit against it.54 The lower court
decisions are in conflict on the question of whether such a right of
53 See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483 (1969); San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995).
54 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824; Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485; San Filippo, 30 F.3d at
427.
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judicial access exists for any' assertion of a legal claim in court, or
conversely only when the plaintiff has asserted a legal claim that is
a matter of public concern. The lower courts disagree on that. I
see Supreme Court decisional law as indicating that any attempt to
resolve a grievance judicially is protected by this constitutional
right of judicial access, whether it is under the free speech clause
or the petition clause. I think that it is another potential avenue for
plaintiffs.
Our next area is prisoners' suits under § 1983. Prisoners
certainly attempt to use § 1983 to vindicate constitutional rights,
but they are not successful too often. One reason they are not
successful is because the Prison Litigation Reform Act" (PLRA)
has an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement for
prisoner actions that challenge the conditions of confinement. 6 I
am seeing fairly large numbers of decisions in which prisoners'
constitutional claims are dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2003).
56 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(a) (2003).
22
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I think the Supreme Court's decision in Porter v. Nussle"
gets the award for being the most predictable decision of the term,
with maybe a few condolences to John Williams who argued the
case for the plaintiff. He won it in the Second Circuit,58 but the
Supreme Court in the unanimous decision held that prisoners who
assert excessive force claims against prison guards must first
exhaust their administrative remedies. 9 The Court stated that it is
a type of claim that is within the category of conditions of
confinement.6" I think it is a follow-up to the decision of a year
ago in which the Supreme Court held that prisoners have to
exhaust their administrative remedies, even if they are only seeking
monetary relief that is not available administratively.6 I think the
Supreme Court is intent on giving an expansive reading to the
PLRA exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement for
prisoners.
" 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
58 Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2000).
59 Porter, 534 U.S. at 520.60 Id. at 532.
61 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 740-41 (2001) ("Congress' imposition
of an obviously broader exhaustion requirement makes it highly implausible that
it meant to give prisoners a strong inducement to skip the administrative process
simply by limiting prayers for relief to money damages not offered through
administrative grievance mechanisms.").
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The award for the most surprising decision goes to Hope v.
Pelzer.62 We have done this program for nineteen years, and I do
not know how many times we have been able to say, "here is a
case in which a prisoner won a § 1983 case," but here is the case.
Maybe there was something magical in the plaintiffs name, Hope,
but the claim succeeded. This is the Alabama chain gang decision.
The prisoners were on work detail and the guards thought that
prisoner Hope was disruptive. As a result, he was hitched to the
hitching post for seven hours, shirtless out in the Alabama sun, and
allowed only one or two water breaks.63 Even for a majority of the
United States Supreme Court, this was found to be a violation of
the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.' It
is notable in terms of it being a prisoner victory.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I think it is a huge victory for
civil rights plaintiffs for two reasons. One is because of the way in
which the Court talks about how it determines whether there is
62 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
63 Id. at 734-35.
64 Id. at 745. "[T]he obvious cruelty inherent in this practice should have
provided respondents with some notice that their alleged conduct violated
Hope's constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment." Id.
24
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clearly established law that a reasonable officer should know.65
Prior to this case, I saw two lines of decisions from both the
Supreme Court and lower courts about how to determine if there is
clearly established law that a reasonable officer should know. The
test under Harlow v. Fitzgerald 6 for determining whether an
officer had qualified immunity is whether the officer violated a
clearly established right that a reasonable officer should know.67
One line of cases said there is only clearly established law if there
is a case already on point. I can point to some Supreme Court
cases and some lower court cases that seem to take that approach.68
The other approach seemed to be that if the officers had fair notice
or fair warning that their conduct was an unconstitutional violation
of federal law, then they were denied qualified immunity even if
there were no cases on point. I can point to Supreme Court
decisions and lower court decisions that took that approach.69
61 Id. at 739.
66 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
67 Id. at 817-18.
68 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Johnson v. Clifton, 74
F.3d 1087 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Mouille v. City of Live Oak Texas, 977 F.2d 924
(5th Cir. 1992).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1997); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966); Johnson v. Wright, 234 F. Supp.
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The Supreme Court in Hope v. Pelzer emphatically adopts
the latter approach.7" The Supreme Court says in Justice Stevens'
majority opinion that there is clearly established law that a
reasonable officer should know if the officer had fair warning or
fair notice.7' Justice Stevens said a case on point would be
sufficient to give fair warning and fair notice, but he says it is not
necessary. 2 He says there are many ways of showing there is fair
warning and fair notice. 3 He goes through, for example, federal
guidance to prisoners; state manuals; existing instructions; as well
as what one of my students calls the knucklehead rule, any officer
should know that chaining a prisoner to a hitching post for six or
seven hours in the hot sun without water and bathroom breaks is
just wrong. 4 I think the most obvious reason that this is a victory
for plaintiffs is that it says there does not have to be a case on
point. 5
2d 352, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Konop v. N.W. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1195 (D.S.D. 1998).
70 Hope, 536 U.S. at 747-48.
7 Id. at 745-46.
72 Id. at 746.
71 Id. at 740-41.
74 Id. at 738. ("As the facts are alleged by Hope, the Eighth Amendment
violation is obvious.")
71 Hope, 536 U.S. at 746-48.
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There is a second, subtler reason why this is important to
plaintiffs. I think it is much easier to go to the jury on this question
after Hope v. Pelzer. It is easier to withstand summary judgment
on the question of whether there is fair warning or fair notice than
would be the issue of whether there is a case on point. If the court
had taken the former approach (i.e. there must be a case already on
point), it would be easy for judges to determine qualified immunity
at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage. The
Supreme Court often says it wants.qualified immunity determined
at that stage.76 If the question is whether there was fair warning or
fair notice to the officer, that seems much more quintessentially a
jury question, and a reasonable jury can often go either way. I
think it will be easier for plaintiffs, in light of what Justice Stevens
said, to withstand summary judgment and get to the jury.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: I think we should spell out that we
have moved into the second category of cases, qualified immunity.
Erwin, there are some parts of this decision that I do not think
76 See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001) (explaining that a
ruling on the issue of qualified immunity should be made early in the
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make a lot of sense. For example, the idea that the court is going
to take into account a state regulation being violated by the state
officials." I am having trouble logically figuring out how that
shows that the constitutional law was clearly established; how that
put officials on notice; and how it gave them fair warning that what
they were doing was unconstitutional. I do not see the logic of it.
The other part that does not make sense is the United States
Department of Justice transmittal to the Alabama Department of
Corrections in which the federal. government told the state that the
way it was using the hitching post was unconstitutional.78 How
does thiat give fair notice to the officials when there was no
evidence in the record that the transmittal came to the attention of
the officials? I think that there are some potential logical flaws in
the decision. On the other hand, I agree with you; this could be a
very helpful decision to plaintiffs because it indicates a flexible
approach to qualified immunity that we have not seen for twenty
years.
proceedings in order to avoid costs and expenses of trial when the defense is
dis ositive). See also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
7Hope, 536 U.S. at 739.78Id. at 737.
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Another problem is that every Supreme Court qualified
immunity decision seems to potentially bring a new approach.
That is why we can do this program every year. The Supreme
Court said fair warning a couple of years back,79 albeit in a
criminal prosecution, but it was referring to § 1983 cases. I have
to say, I have grave doubts about whether the Supreme Court
intends at all that qualified immunity be a jury question. One thing
that the Court wants with respect to qualified immunity is that the
issue be decided early in the litigation. I think you are giving
plaintiffs good ideas to push the case to settlement, but I am
dubious.
PROFESSOR BLUM: Just a couple of words. I think Hope v.
Pelzer is, of course, a good case for plaintiffs; there is nothing bad
in it, but there is nothing new in it. I see Hope as a distinct
message to the Eleventh Circuit, which was the only circuit "over
the edge" in the qualified immunity area, to pull back and join the
crowd. The Eleventh Circuit, in that case, found that there is a
constitutional violation when you hang somebody out in the heat
79 See, e.g., Lanier, 520 U.S. at 259.
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for seven hours with no water, but qualified immunity attached
because there was no case right on point.8" There is no other
circuit in the country that would have held that. After Hope, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to three other Eleventh Circuit
cases,8 1 vacated the opinions, and remanded in light of Hope. They
were all the same type of opinions, where the court recognized a
jury could find a constitutional violation but, because there was no
case exactly on point, the court granted qualified immunity. '2
Hope is great for the plaintiffs, but it is reinforcing things the
Supreme Court said in Lanier 3 and Wilson v. Layne,8" and I believe
it was a message, particularly to the Eleventh Circuit.
The state regulations, violations of those regulations, and
the Justice Department report that had been sent to the Mississippi
80 Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 730
(2002).
81 Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178 (1 1th Cir. 2001), vacated by 537
U.S. 801 (2002); Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027 (11 th Cir. 2001), vacated by
536 U.S. 953 (2002); Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1177 (1 1th Cir. 2001),
vacated by 536 U.S. 953 (2002).
82 Willingham, 261 F.3d at 1188; Vaughan, 264 F.3d at 1037; Thomas, 261
F.3d at 1177. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit initially reinstated all three
opinions. See Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003);
Vaughan v. Cox, 316 F.3d 1210 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d
950 (11th Cir. 2003). Subsequently, in a surprise turnabout, the court, in a
rehearing sua sponte, reversed its grant of qualified immunity in Vaughan. See
Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
83 520 U.S. at 529.
84 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
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prison were all icing on the cake. The Supreme Court told the
Eleventh Circuit that its own precedent was close enough. 5 It was
not shackling to a hitching post, but rather shackling to a cell bar,
and the Court did not see a big difference there; not a difference
for constitutional purposes or for qualified immunity purposes.8 6
So, there was a case that was close enough to give fair warning
under anybody's standards.
Finally, I know the Second Circuit tells you to give the case
to the jury when there is a dispute about the facts, and that, in such
cases, the ultimate question of reasonableness goes to the jury,87
but the Second Circuit is a little out of tune with the other circuits
on that issue. I think the Supreme Court makes it clear that this is
a question of law to be decided by the judge, not the jury.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: First, there was no doubt in
this case that there was an Eighth Amendment violation. The
85Hope, 536 U.S. at 742. The Court noted Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir. 1974), which is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit through
application of Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981). Hope, 536
U.S. at 742.
86 Id. at 742.
87 See, e.g., Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1994). But see
Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d 68, 78-81 n.16 (2d Cir. 2003) (suggesting better
approach is to reserve qualified immunity issue for judge).
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Eleventh Circuit said there was a constitutional violation, but the
officers had qualified immunity because there was no law on
point.8" Second, as to whether this case adds something new, I
think it is the clearest statement ever by the Supreme Court on the
test for determining whether there is clearly established law that
should give a reasonable officer fair warning and fair notice. I
contrast this to, for example, Wilson v. Layne.89 That was a
situation where federal agents brought reporters with them when
they executed a warrant.90  The Supreme Court decided
unanimously that this was a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
but then ruled eight-to-one that qualified immunity existed.91 The
decision stated that there was no case on point yet,9 2 even though
every court that did rule on it to that point stated it was a Fourth
Amendment violation." I do think there is a difference in phrasing
88 Hope, 240 F.3d at 982.
89 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
90 d. at 605.
9' Id. at 605-06.92 Id. at 616.
93 See, e.g., Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994) (referring to 18
U.S.C. § 3105, which expressly limits the presence of third parties in the
execution of a search warrant to those occasions when necessary to aid an
officer in its execution); Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir. 1995)
(noting that core Fourth Amendment protection includes an individual's right to
be free from a search of one's residence); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th
Cir. 1997) (noting that the court was unable to find any circuit decision
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here, at least of clarity. Third, there is the question of how it is
determined whether there is fair warning or fair notice. I think
Marty is right. The narrow question should be, was there fair
notice or fair warning that their conduct violated the Constitution
or federal statutes? The Department of Justice transmittal or state
regulations do not really go to that issue. The fact that Justice
Stevens was willing to say that this is part of what gives fair
warning or notice opens the door to plaintiffs to use things like that
to show fair warning and fair notice. It may be icing on the cake,
but that is not how Justice Stevens describes it.
Finally, maybe most important in terms of judge versus
jury, obviously Karen is right; the Supreme Court repeatedly says
it wants qualified immunity to be decided when possible by the
judge rather than the jury.94 Think of the test as phrased by Justice
Stevens here; did the officers have fair warning or fair notice?
That seems to have a very factual nature to it. There are not only
upholding the constitutionality of the presence of broadcast media for non-law
enforcement purposes during the execution of a search warrant). See also Bills
v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that officers in command of a
dwelling violate the trust of their authority by allowing the presence of third
parties who have no connection to the search warrant).
9' Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
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Second Circuit decisions,95 but a series of decisions from Judge
Posner in the Seventh Circuit,96 and Ninth Circuit decisions97 that
would say that the determination of reasonableness is for the jury,
not the judge. I argued a case in the Ninth Circuit a couple of
weeks ago where a prisoner was denied a kosher diet.98 I tried to
emphasize to the court that after Hope v. Pelzer, the issue is not
whether I can persuade them that the officer acted unreasonably,
but rather whether a reasonable jury could believe that the officers
had fair notice, and therefore summary judgment was
inappropriate. So, I do not think this is revolutionary about judge
versus jury, but I do think it is beneficial.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Erwin, I do not think it is a new
test. I think it is a different way to look at the same test. If the
federal law were clearly established, then we would conclude that
the officer had fair warning or fair notice. If the federal law was
not clearly established, then we would say the officer did not have
95 See, e.g., Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995).
96 See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir. 1993).
97 See, e.g., Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000); Chew v.
Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994).
98 Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003).
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fair warning. I think these just become alternative ways of
describing the same test.
We will move ahead to the third area, which is enforcement
of federal statutes under § 1983. I think this issue should be a
question of congressional intent: Did the Congress intend that a
particular federal statute would be enforceable under § 1983? I
think even in the world of legal academia that is maybe too much
theory to swallow because it is rare when there is any actual
congressional intent on the issue. If you accept that hypothesis, the
question would become, "How does the court deal with this issue
of whether a federal statute is enforceable under § 1983?" The
issue would become: "If Congress had thought about this issue,
would it have intended that the federal statute be enforceable -under
§ 1983?" This is then, at best, a question of hypothetical
congressional intent.
This is an area which has kept this program in business for
many years. It is a tough topic not only because of the issues, but
also because the audiences do not get overexcited when they hear
about the subject. It is an important subject because you have a
tremendously wide range of federal statutes which might not have
35
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enforcement mechanisms within them, so perhaps the only way to
enforce the federal statute is against the state or local official under
§ 1983. The case law from the Supreme Court is, in my opinion,
very uneven. It starts out with absolute gangbusters going back to
1980 when the Supreme Court stated that all federal statutes are
enforceable under § 1983 against state and local officials.9 The
next year, the Supreme Court does a very quick retreat and says it
didn't mean that literally, and there are some federal statutes not
enforceable under § 1983."
Federal statutes that only declare congressional policy do
not create rights and are not enforceable under § 1983. Federal
statutes that have comprehensive enforcement mechanisms
indicate an intent by Congress that those mechanisms be exclusive
and that the statute not be enforceable under § 1983. Over the last
twenty years, some of the decisions could be characterized as pro-
plaintiff decisions, some of them pro-defendant decisions. Very
significant is that the most recent decisions from the Supreme
99 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
'oo Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 20 (1981).
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Court, in my opinion, including the decision last term in Gonzaga
University v. Doe,'° are decidedly pro-defendant decisions.
Gonzaga dealt with a provision of the Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).' 2 FERPA provides that federal
funds should not be distributed to educational institutions that have
a policy or practice of releasing educational records without
parental consent.' 3 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court
held that this provision of FERPA is not enforceable under §
1983."0 Now, I do not think we should spend a long time trying to
guess who the five are. These are the five Justices who have been
so forceful in the federalism area, the Federalism Five: the Chief
Justice, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
And, you might ask, what does this have to do with
federalism? I think it has everything to do with federalism. The
issue in this case involves the enforcement of federal statutes,
normally in federal court, against state and local government. I
think this is very much a federalism issue. The Gonzaga decision
'o' 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
102 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2000).
'o'20 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1).
1o Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290.
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is a very important decision, not only because of its specific
holding that FERPA is not enforceable under § 1983, but also
because I think that the way the majority opinion is written by the
Chief Justice is going to make it more difficult for plaintiffs'
lawyers to enforce federal statutes under § 1983. At one point, he
goes out of his way to say a federal statute will not be enforceable
under § 1983 unless it creates a right on the part of the plaintiff in
unambiguous terms.' °: The dissenters read that as creating a type
of presumption that federal statutes are not enforceable under §
1983,"06 which is the complete opposite presumption from the way
this area of the law originated. He also goes out of his way to say
that it is unlikely that federal legislation enacted under the
spending power, such as FERPA, will be found to be enforceable
under § 1983."° - He says there are only two cases in which
spending power legislation has been found to be enforceable under
§ 1983.1 8
105 Id
06 ld at 293.
107 Id at 279.
'o' Id. at 279-80 (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth.,
479 U.S. 418 (1987) (tenants living in low-income housing projects sued under
§ 1983 claiming respondent violated provisions of the Housing Act of 1937));
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n., 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (health care providers
sought to enforce a provision of the Medicaid Act under § 1983).
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I do not want to be overly pessimistic, but I think what is
going to happen in future cases is that defendants' attorneys are
going to say to the district court judge, "The plaintiffs burden is to
show that this federal statute created a right in 'unambiguous
terms."' And, if it is spending power legislation, I think
defendants' attorneys are also going to harp on that part of the
decision. Erwin, you thought maybe not, that perhaps it could be
read narrower?
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I think it is an enormously
important case and an important victory for defendants' lawyers.
Chief Justice Rehnquist is the circuit justice for the Fourth Circuit,
and when he spoke there this summer he described this as his
sleeper case of the term because of its significance. To put it in
context, since coming on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist has
repeatedly urged narrowing of the ability to use § 1983 to enforce
federal statutes. He wrote an opinion several years ago which held
that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce a federal law requiring state
39
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and local governments to develop a plan.'09 Congress then adopted
a statute to overrule that decision."' However, Rehnquist has
repeatedly tried to narrow the availability of § 1983.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Nobody followed that statute, or
almost nobody, right?
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I will take a minute to tell how
the statute was written. There was a hearing before the Senate
Finance Committee in 1992. Senator Moynihan was chairing.
There were four witnesses at the hearing; someone from the
Attorney General's Office in Illinois, someone from the Attorney
General's Office in Florida, Jim Wyles from the Children's Defense
Fund, and I was there as a witness. We are in the middle of the
testimony and a bell went off, and Senator Moynihan said we now
109 Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1992). The Court held that the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 did not provide a private
right of action for respondent to seek enforcement of the provisions of the Act
under § 1983. It noted that a provision under the Act requiring states to submit a
plan for eligibility to participate in a federal program created by the Act does not
create a requirement that the terms of the plan must be enforced. Id. at 363-64.
1042 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (2003). The statute does not foreclose plaintiffs from
seeking to enforce provisions of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 301)
requiring state plans or development of plans. However, it expressly precludes
[Vol 19
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have to adjourn to go vote on the floor of the Senate. He asked
each of us when we were flying home. If you read the transcript of
the hearing, right there we are talking about our flight schedule.
He said, "Good, being that each of you have an hour or two, I want
you to come into this back room with my staff and try to draft
some language to overrule Suter v. Artist M." The other witnesses
and I sat around a table, and lobbyists from the Association of
Attorney Generals and States sat at the outer ring. At one point, on
a piece of yellow paper I wrote, "How about this?," and wrote out
a couple of sentences. With only a minor change, it was adopted
in a bill that the first President Bush vetoed and then President
Clinton signed, and that is the language that overruled Suter v.
Artist M. That is the only time I can say I really know the
legislative history behind a federal statutory provision.
JUDGE PRATT: Is that the statute that Marty says nobody pays
any attention to?
plaintiffs from seeking to enforce the provisions of the specific section of the
statute challenged in Suter.
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PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: Exactly. The only thing I want
to say about Gonzaga is that dissenting Justices Stevens and
Breyer described the majority opinion very broadly. If you read it
this broadly, then it really can have a devastating effect on a lot of
§ 1983 litigation. There are many federal statutes that do not
create a cause of action. For example, many laws adopted in
spending programs, like the provisions of the Social Security Act
and the Medicaid law, do not create a cause of action. If you read
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion most broadly, what it says is that
there only can be a 1983 action to enforce a law adopted by
Congress under its spending power if that is a law under which
there would be a private right of action. You would have to meet
the restrictive test for private right of action, and that is extremely
difficult to do. For plaintiffs' lawyers, I think there are reasons to
narrowly interpret what the majority is doing. When you look at
the federal statute at issue in Gonzaga, there is reason to believe it
did not create enforceable rights, and subsequently everything else
in Chief Rehnquist's decision is dicta.
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The circuits are starting to split on the significance of
Gonzaga."' I think the Supreme Court will have to clarify whether
the majority opinion was to be read broadly. Is it that you cannot
use 1983 to enforce a law adopted under the spending power
unless a private right of action to enforce that statute exists, or is
this really a much narrower question about no private rights of
action under this particular statute?
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The problem is that it is not just
this decision. This follows what I see as a recent trend, and I think
that is something that lower court judges are likely to be looking
at. The courts will ask, what has the Supreme Court been doing
recently, and I think there are negative messages.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: The Supreme Court, in a 1997
case called Blessing v. Freestone,' 12 did rule in favor of the
' See, e.g., Nat'l. Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. Face, 322 F.3d 802 (4th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 152 (2003); accord Taylor v. Vermont Dep't.
of Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d
797 (6th Cir. 2002); Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297 F.3d 1058 (10th
Cir. 2002); Missouri Child Care Ass'n v. Cross, 294 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2002).
112 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
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plaintiffs in terms of the availability of § 1983 to enforce a
provision of the Social Security Act."3 So, though there are cases
like Gonzaga and Suter that go against plaintiffs, there is also
Virginia Hospital Association v. Wilder,"4 which allowed 1983 to
be used to enforce laws adopted under the spending power. I think
plaintiffs and defendants each have cases on point, but I do not
mean to disagree with your overall characterization about the
likely significance of this case.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Let us move to the fourth area,
pleadings in a civil rights case. The decision is Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema,"' actually a Title VII Age Discrimination and
Employment Act Case which adopts the notice pleadings standard
" Id. at 332. The specific section the Court referenced, 42 U.S.C §§ 651-
669(b), requires states to establish a comprehensive plan for enforcing the
payment of child support in order for children to be eligible for welfare benefits
under the Aid to Families With Dependent Children Program. The plaintiffs,
mothers residing within the state of Arizona, claimed they had individual rights
for the state program to substantially comply with the statutory requirements.
They sought to enforce those rights pursuant to § 1983. Id.
"' 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (holding health care providers could challenge the
methods by which they are reimbursed by the states under provisions of the
Medicare Act).
"' 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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for this type of discrimination claim.1 6 Erwin, you were telling me
that you think this decision would be important to § 1983 cases.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I think so. In 1993, in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit,"7 the Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, held
that there was no heightened pleading requirement for § 1983 suits
against local governments."' Interestingly, in the Leatherman
case, the Supreme Court left open the question of whether there
would be heightened pleading in qualified immunity cases. Well,
in Swierkiewicz, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court,
emphatically says there is no heightened pleading ever in federal
court unless the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for it, as
in cases of fraud and mistake."9 I think the courts could not be
clearer here that the federal rules are about notice pleading, and
heightened pleading is inconsistent with those rules. I think the
116 Id. at 512. The Court held that in cases alleging employment
discrimination, plaintiffs need only provide notice of alleged discriminatory
conduct pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) which requires a short, plain statement
of the claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id.
117 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
IS Id. at 164.
119 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513.
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issue that comes up is whether a federal court can require, in a
qualified immunity case, a responsive pleading on the part of the
plaintiff once the defendant raises qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense.
PROFESSOR BLUM: I agree with that. In all non-prisoner §
1983 cases since Swierkiewicz, every circuit except the First and
the Eleventh has rejected the heightened pleading requirements.'2 °
The reply that Erwin referred to in the Schultea"' case in the Fifth
Circuit says that when government officials raise the defense of
qualified immunity in their answer, the plaintiff may be required to
reply with particularity as to why the immunity defense cannot be
raised.' -2 I think that is still okay because the Crawford El "3 case
referred to both the reply under Rule 7(a) and the Rule 12(e)
120 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234-36 (11th Cir. 2003)
(insisting on heightened pleading in civil rights cases); Judge v. City of Lowell,
160 F.3d 67, 72-74 (1st Cir. 1998) (Circuit's heightened pleading requirement
survives Crawford-El). But see Torres-Ocasio v. Melendez, 283 F. Supp. 2d
505, 512 (D.P.R. 2003) ("[T]here is some disagreement in this Circuit on
whether the standard set in Judge has been abrogated by the recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Swierkiewicz.").
'- Schultea v. Wood, 27 F.3d 1112 (5th Cir. 1994).
122 Id. at 1116 n.2 (citing Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d 237, 246 (5th Cir.
1993)).
123 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
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motion for a more definite statement as techniques that were still
acceptable to use when more specificity is needed to resolve the
immunity issue. 124
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The only thing that I would be
cautious about if I am a plaintiffs lawyer, and I think defendants'
lawyers should be thinking about this also, everything Erwin said
about Swierkiewicz is right, but people said the same thing after
Leatherman was decided. The problem is that the reality of
litigation being what it is, there are going to be some district court
judges who may be hostile to § 1983 claims, or particular types of
civil rights claims, and there are plaintiffs' lawyers who may be
too conclusory in thinking notice pleading is sufficient Under
Swierkiewicz. The ammunition is there, because in Swierkiewicz,
Justice Thomas referred to the form complaints in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. -125 If you look at the form complaint with
respect to negligence, it is about as conclusory as it can be; it is
about two sentences.
124 Id. at 598.
125 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 n.4 (noting that the forms "are intended to
indicate the simplicity and brevity of statements which the rules contemplate").
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After Leatherman, there are still circuit court decisions
holding that the plaintiff has to identify the policy that is alleged to
provide a basis for municipal liability, allege facts supporting the
existence of that policy, and allege causation between the policy
and the constitutionally protected rights. 26 I would say that just as
judges can disagree over whether complaint allegations are
sufficient to satisfy a heightened pleading standard, they could well
disagree over whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient
to satisfy notice pleading. For example, what if there was an
allegation in the complaint asserting that, as a result of a municipal
policy or custom, the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free
of arrest without probable cause was violated. Would that be
sufficient? Under a strict reading of notice pleading, you can say
the defendant now is on notice in this municipal liability claim.
However, I could see many federal district court judges saying
126 See, e.g., Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 605 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding plaintiff failed to show causal connection between her
employment termination and motives of the defendant's administrative
personnel); Lanigan v. Viii. of E. Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 479 (7th Cir. 1997)
(arguing that factual support and direct causal link are required to support
allegations that municipal policy caused constitutional deprivation); accord
Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 1994). See also
Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that plaintiffs
failed to provide evidence from which a jury could find that City maintained
policy authorizing unlawful entry or excessive force during arrest).
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they want the plaintiff to identify the policy, and maybe even
identify the factual basis for the policy. I would be careful if I
were a plaintiffs lawyer and not over rely on Swierkiewicz.
JUDGE PRATT: 'Before you leave that, Marty, I think you may
be a little unfair in saying there may be judges out there that do this
because they are hostile to civil rights claims. Judges are
overworked. The problem is they have to get the lawsuit over
with. They see something come up, a typical broad claim, and
they want to zero in and find out if there is anything really to this
claim. And many judges would like to see a heightened pleading
requirement with special kinds of claims that are easily pled. That
has been done in the case of fraud. Qualified immunity is one area
that is inflicted on the lower courts by a Supreme Court that says it
wants summary judgment on qualified immunity as close to the
filing of the complaint as possible; and the judges want to get to it.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The question then becomes, why
single out § 1983 claims? That is how this got started.
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JUDGE PRATT: It is fifteen percent of the docket.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The heightened pleading rule for
1983 claims started like a virus; one court did it, and a second
court did it, and pretty soon all of the circuits in the country were
doing it. These last two decisions attempt to put a stop to some of
it.
JUDGE PRATT: Only because it works.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: There was a decision last term in
Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko;"'7 it is a Bivens case
against a private entity that was alleged to be involved in federal
government action. 2" There is an underlying issue here that never
gets resolved, and that is whether a private prison entity is involved
in government action for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Putting that aside, the holding in the case is that a
Bivens claim cannot be asserted against an entity. 9 The Supreme
127 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
128 Id. at 66.
129 Id. at 61.
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Court previously held that a Bivens claim could not be asserted
against a government entity, and now the Court is holding that it
cannot be asserted against any entity. When the Bivens claim
exists, it is a remedy that lies only against the particular federal
official. 30 What the Supreme Court said in Malesko was that the
purpose of the Bivens doctrine is to deter constitutional violations
by federal officials, not to provide a remedy against entities. 3' I
have to say, I find that a little disingenuous because I do not think
that the Court has been particularly concerned about deterring
constitutional violations by federal officials for a very long time.
I think we have a very dramatic turn of events under the
Bivens doctrine. Initially, the Supreme Court held in the first three
cases that came before it (Bivens being the first), that a claim could
be asserted for violation of a federal right directly under the
Constitution against a federal official.' You cannot use § 1983 in
130 Id. at 67-68. The Court has extended the holding in Bivens only twice in
thirty years. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court extended
Bivens to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative
remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct.
The Court also extended Bivens to permit a plaintiff to pursue an otherwise
nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted
unconstitutionally. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
'3' Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70.
132 Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 397; Davis, 442 U.S. at 248; Carlson, 446 U.S. at
18.
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these cases, so the choice is a Bivens remedy or no remedy at all.
During the past almost twenty years, the Court has rejected every
attempt by plaintiffs to assert a claim under the Bivens doctrine.'33
The award I would give for the understatement of the term
is the Court's statement that since 1980, "our decisions have
responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be
extended into new contexts,"""' and "we have consistently refused
to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of
defendants.""' Cautious is really the understatement. The Court
has found one reason or another to reject the Bivens claim for some
very fundamental reasons, and it is a very different judicial
philosophy that exists now as compared to the period in the 1970s
and the early 1980s. At the time the Bivens doctrine was
formulated, the Supreme Court stated that plaintiffs were entitled
'33 See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (declining respondent's
claim for damages based on claim of due process violation for denial of social
security benefits); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (declining to extend
cause of action for damages for retaliatory demotion under employment
relationship governed by the Civil Service Commission regulations). See also
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (unanimously rejecting a Bivens
claim for damages to enlisted military personnel for injuries caused by
unconstitutional actions of superior officers).
134 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (quoting Schweiker,
487 U.S. at 421).
' Id. at 68.
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to money damages for violations of their constitutional rights.'
3 6
Now the Court is saying the opposite. The Court is saying things
like, this issue about remedies for constitutional violations is for
Congress. 137 So, there is a separation of powers issue. I think we
have come from a fairly strong presumption in favor of the Bivens
doctrine to a fairly strong presumption against it.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I agree with what you are
saying. An example is the Court's continual willingness to assume
that private prisons are state actors. You might remember a case
called Richardson v. McKnight,'38 which dealt with whether private
prison guards are entitled to qualified immunity. Justice Breyer's
opinion assumes that private prisons are state actors.'39 The lower
courts are going in that continual direction, saying that private
prisons are performing a public function. 4 °
136 Bivens, 403 U. S. at 397.
13 7 See generally Malesko, 534 U.S. at 61; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 14.
138 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
139 Id. at 406 (discussing the historical role played by private parties in
administering correctional functions for the state which does not provide any
conclusive evidence that private parties were entitled to immunity in performing
prison management functions).
40 See Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991); Gabriel v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 211 F. Supp. 2d 132, 137-38 (D.D.C. 2002); Blumel v.
Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423, 426-27 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
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The second point that I would make is that although the
Court is continuing to narrow Bivens, it is not overruling or
signaling an overruling of Bivens. The core of Bivens is that if a
federal officer violates a constitutional right, there is generally a
remedy available. That has not been overturned., Now what the
Court says in Malesko, like it did in FDIC v. Meyer 4' a few years
earlier, is that you cannot bring a Bivens suit against an agency.'1
4 2
In Bush v. Lucas'43 and Schweiker v. Chilicky,'44 the Court has said
that if Congress has provided an alternative remedy, you do not
have a Bivens scheme. 45  Although those are important
narrowings, and I agree with you about what they reflect, it is
important to emphasize that Bivens is still there and used every day
whenever someone has a damage claim for a constitutional
violation against a federal officer.
'4' 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
142 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68.
14' 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
144 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
14' See Bush, 462 U.S. at 392; Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423.
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